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1. Introduction 
This paper elaborates on Mitchell (2001a) who opened with the statement: “the 
unemployed cannot find jobs that are not there!”. It presents a critique of the policy 
practice conditioned by the NAIRU approach that has led to high costs in terms of 
persistent unemployment. At the macroeconomic level, the dominant economic theory 
has, since the mid-1970s, cajoled policy makers to follow policies that have 
deliberately and persistently deflated their economies under the false impression that 
the role of policy is to ensure the economy is operating at the natural rate of 
unemployment. The profession seems to have become obsessed with supply side 
remedies to the high unemployment, despite the fact that most economies have failed 
to generate sufficient jobs over the last 25 years to match the growth in their labour 
forces. The costs of unemployment have seemingly been ignored (Watts and Mitchell, 
2000). There is now considerable evidence that rises in unemployment are highly 
persistent and cumulative and permanent costs are incurred if active policy does not 
seek to reduce it quickly (Mitchell, 1993, 2001). There is also mounting evidence 
against the dynamics implied by the NAIRU approach (Chang, 1997; Fair, 2000; 
Akerlof et al, 2000, Mitchell and Carlson, 2001). 
Modigliani, who introduced the term NAIRU to the economics profession (Modigliani 
and Papademos, 1975), has recently argued  that 
Unemployment is primarily due to lack of aggregate demand. This is mainly 
the outcome of erroneous macroeconomic policies… [the decisions of Central 
Banks] … inspired by an obsessive fear of inflation, … coupled with a benign 
neglect for unemployment … have resulted in systematically over tight 
monetary policy decisions, apparently based on an objectionable use of the so-
called NAIRU approach. The contractive effects of these policies have been 
reinforced by common, very tight fiscal policies (Modigliani, 2000: 3, 
emphasis in original) 
We examine the evidence needed to support this statement from Modigliani, by 
comparing the experience of the Australian economy to that of the Netherlands over 
the last 30 odd years. We show that in particular misguided government policy has 
been responsible for the persistently high unemployment and the cumulative and 
permanent losses to social and economic well-being entailed.  
The comparison between Australia and the Netherlands is interesting because they 
share many features yet in other ways are quite distinct. Both are relatively small, 
highly developed open economies with a well-developed system of social security. 
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However, Australia relies on exports of primary commodities, whereas the 
Netherlands due to the more diverse nature of its exports enjoys a more stable terms 
of trade. The feature of the Dutch economy that separates it from others, including 
Australia, is that it forms a transport hub for major trade in Europe and beyond. 
Moreover, the Netherlands has experienced robust employment growth of  2.9 per 
cent per annum over the period 1995–2000, whereas the corresponding figure for 
Australia was 1.6 per cent. As a consequence the rate of unemployment in the 
Netherlands in 1999 was 3.3 per cent, compared to 7.2 per cent in Australia. However, 
the apparent success in combating unemployment in the Netherlands is partly clouded 
by the huge increase in inactivity since the early 1980s. While there were 267 
thousand persons officially unemployed in 2000, the number of disabled workers 
entitled to benefits was recorded to be over 900 thousand! In terms of the labour 
force, this group (including sickness benefits recipients) has more than doubled. The 
percentage in terms of the labour force rose from 9 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 
1980. It remained at that level more or less ever since. This feature induced, for 
instance, OECD (1998) to report that, when defined in a “broad” sense, 
unemployment in the Netherlands would reach around 25 percent of the labour force 
(see also Muysken, 2001).  
Section 2 challenges the view held by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (LNJ) (1991), 
among others, that the rise in unemployment can be attributed to reducing search 
effectiveness among the unemployed. According to this view, search effectiveness has 
declined as welfare benefits have risen. We argue that jobs have to exist before search 
can be effective. Moreover, job growth is determined by aggregate demand. Section 2 
thus outlines the direct effects on unemployment of adverse shocks in aggregate 
demand. Section 3 analyses the indirect effects through hysteresis in unemployment. 
Using attractor analysis in an unemployment-vacancies context we show that adverse 
demand shocks have increased unemployment in both countries through hysteresis. 
Section 4 digresses into the supply side explanations of unemployment to show that 
they lack explanatory credibility. Section 5 shows how deficiencies in both  fiscal and 
monetary policy and in business investment go a long way to explaining the 
deficiency in aggregate demand that has generated the unemployment. We also 
challenge the view that the private sector are able to produce enough jobs if they are 
less constrained by regulation. Concluding remarks follow. 
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2. Unemployed need jobs and jobs need aggregate demand 
Over the last 25 years, as unemployment has risen and persisted at high levels, 
orthodox economists have concentrated on the supply side of the labour market, 
hypothesising that full employment now occurs at much higher unemployment rates 
than in the past. Piore (1979: 10) reminds us that: 
Presumably, there is an irreducible residual level of unemployment composed 
of people who don’t want to work, who are moving between jobs, or who are 
unqualified. If there is in fact some such residual level of unemployment, it is 
not one we have encountered in the United States. Never in the post war 
period has the government been unsuccessful when it has made a sustained 
effort to reduce unemployment. (emphasis in original) 
Figure 1 plots the UV ratio for Australia from September 1966 to December 2000 and 
for the Netherlands (using annual data) from 1966 to 2000. Notwithstanding sectoral 
variations, at first blush, we are dealing with heavily demand-constrained economies. 
Since the mid-1970s there were on average 11 unemployed for each vacancy in 
Australia, and 7 unemployed in the Netherlands.1 We repeat Mitchell’s (2001a) 
opening sentence: The unemployed cannot find jobs that are not there! 
Figure 1 UV ratio for the Australia and the Netherlands, 1966-2000 
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(a) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
Source: Australia, ABS AUSSTATS, NIF current series data. Netherlands CPB (2001) and Muysken et 
al. (1994) and Ministry of Social Affairs (2001). The ratio is total unemployed (000s) to unfilled 
vacancies (000’s). Australian data is quarterly, whereas the Netherlands is annual. 
Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate on the left hand scale plotted against the sum 
of employment and vacancies (as a percentage of the labour force) as a measure of 
labour demand on the right hand scale (inverted). The correspondence between the 
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two series is striking and a major part of the variation in the unemployment rate 
appears to be associated with the evolution of demand. 
Modigliani (2000) has presented similar graphs for France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, which shows that as job availability declines the unemployment rate rises, 
with the concomitant outcomes that the search process lengthens, as does the average 
duration of unemployment. Modigliani (2000: 5) concluded, “Everywhere 
unemployment has risen because of a large shrinkage in the number of positions 
needed to satisfy existing demand.” 
Figure 2 Labour demand and unemployment, Australia and the Netherlands, 1966-
2000 
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Source: see Figure 1. 
In Mitchell and Muysken (2002) we show in line with Modigliani (2000) that the 
level of aggregate demand rather than the labour force (supply) determines the level 
of employment. For both Australia and the Netherlands the major shifts in 
employment fortunes are closely related to similar directional shifts in real demand. 
Real demand growth was subdued in Australia following the 1974 recession, which in 
relative terms was not as severe as the two later recessions (1982 and 1991). The same 
holds for the Netherlands after the 1981 recession. 
We also show that the rise in unemployment was associated with a marked deficiency 
in aggregate demand. Had aggregate demand not fallen in the mid-1970s and 
remained well below the 1960s levels for the next decade, the unemployment rate 
would not have risen significantly in Australia. The severity of the demand restraint 
meant that the unemployed pool rose far beyond what could be absorbed in any 
normal recovery. A similar case applies for the Netherlands, where aggregate demand 
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fell sharply in the early 1980s.2 We elaborate these notions when we discuss the GDP-
gap further on. 
3. Recession-driven hysteresis in unemployment 
Part of the upward movement in unemployment could also be explained from shifts in 
the unemployment-vacancy (UV) relationship, the so-called Beveridge curve. Much 
has been made of the shift in this relationship over time. Figure 3 plots the vacancies 
(thousands) against unemployment (thousands) for both Australia and the Netherlands 
from 1966 to 2000. The outward shifts are clearly shown. The three noticeable 
outward shifts in the Australian Beveridge curve occurred in 1974, 1982, and in 1991. 
Similarly a minor outward shift occurred in the Netherlands in 1975 followed by a 
strong outward shift in 1981. It is no surprise that these shifts are driven by cyclical 
downturns rather than any autonomous supply side shifts. Mitchell (1987) has 
previously shown that structural imbalances (supply constraints) can be the result of 
cyclical variations and can be resolved, in part, by attenuating the amplitude of the 
downturns. 
LNJ (1991: 4, 38) argue that these shifts are due to a failure of the unemployed to 
seek work as effectively as before. They explain the outward shift in the European 
Beveridge curve by “a fall in the search effectiveness …among the unemployed” 
(1991: 38). LNJ (1991: 268) also claim that the UV shift has been due to “rise in long-
term unemployment, which reduces search effectiveness…” What does this mean? 
LNJ (1991: 38) offer the following explanation: “Either the workers have become 
more choosey in taking jobs, or firms become more choosey in filling vacancies 
(owing for example to discrimination against the long-term unemployed or to 
employment protection legislation.)” They suggest that the first reason dominates.  
There is clearly an observational equivalence problem in attempting to test for this. 
Search time will lengthen when there are large cyclical downturns and the probability 
of gaining a job decreases. With UV ratios averaging 11.1 or 6.9 unemployed persons 
per vacancy over the last 26 years, it is a fallacy of composition to conclude that if all 
individuals reduced their reservation wage to the minimum (to maximise supply-side 
search effectiveness) that unemployment would significantly fall (given the small 
estimated real balance effects in most studies). Further, unless growth in labour 
requirements is symmetrical and labour force growth steady on both sides of the 
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business cycle, the pool of unemployed can rise and remain persistently high 
(Mitchell, 2001a). 
Figure 3 Beveridge curve, Australia and The Netherlands, 1966-2000 
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(b) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
Source: see Figure 1. 
3.1 The impact of recessions and long-term unemployment 
To examine the impact of recessions on the UV relationship and look for the impact 
of rising long-term unemployment we ran a simple regression. We use the proportion 
of long-term unemployed to total unemployment (PLTU) as the “search 
effectiveness” variable as suggested by LNJ (1991). We show below that this variable 
is itself affected by recession, which has significant implications for the credibility of 
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the supply side story. We also include dummy variables: for the Netherlands 
Recession_1 (zero until 1975, unity thereafter) and Recession_2 (zero until 1981, 
unity thereafter), and for Australia Recession_2 (zero until March 1983, unity 
thereafter) and Recession_3 (zero until March 1991, unity thereafter).3 They are 
included as intercept dummies and are allowed to interact with the vacancy rate to test 
for slope changes. The dependent variable is the log of the Vacancy Rate (LVR).4 
Table 1 reveals that the UV relationship is displaced by the rise in long-term 
unemployment, but the recessions exacerbate the outward shift. All recessions appear 
to have worsened the trade-off between unfilled vacancies and unemployment. 
Table 1 Beveridge curve regression, Australia and the Netherlands 
 Australia The Netherlands 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 1.47 (27.3) 1.10 (16.2) 
LVR -0.09 (2.11) -1.03 (15.4) 
PLTU 0.02 (9.13) 0.01 (4.28) 
RECESSION_2   0.25 (2.14) 
RECESSION_3 0.04 (2.03)   
RECESSION_1*LVR   0.62 (6.98) 
RECESSION_2*LVR -0.21 (4.26)   
     
R-squared 0.83  0.98  
S.E. as % of mean LUR 3.88  8.37  
Source: See Figure 1. The regression for Australia uses quarterly data from March 1978 to June 2000. 
The regression for The Netherlands uses annual data from 1966 to 2000. The dependent variable was 
the log of the unemployment rate. VR is the log of the vacancy rate, PLTU is the proportion of long-
term unemployment. 
To summarise this recession-driven outward shift in the UV relationship, we 
calculated the rate of unemployment at which unemployment would equal vacancies. 
The results are summarised in Table 2 and clearly illustrate the outward shifts of the 
UV curve after each recession. This evidence is strongly supportive of the hysteresis 
hypothesis, since each recession shifts the UV-curve outward. 
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Table 2 Rate of unemployment equal to vacancies, Australia and the Netherlands5 
 Australia The Netherlands 
Pre Recession 1 0.87 1.90 
Recession 1 4.53 2.64 
Recession 2 5.06 4.22 
Source: Table 1. 
Figure 4 shows that the relationship between long-term unemployment and the 
unemployment rate is very close. As unemployment rises (falls), the proportion of 
long-term unemployed rises (falls) with a lag. Several studies have formally examined 
this relationship. Chapman et al. (1992), EPAC (1996), and Mitchell (2000b, 2001a) 
have all found that a rising proportion of long-term unemployed is not a separate 
problem from that of the general rise in unemployment in Australia. However, it is 
remarkable that the proportion of long-term unemployment is much higher in the 
Netherlands, compared to Australia, and hardly falls when unemployment falls, a 
characteristic common across most European countries. The notion that a relatively 
more generous welfare system in Europe may explain the latter phenomenon, 
motivated the supply-side policy emphasis that OECD governments have adopted 
over the last two decades. 
Figure 4 Proportion of LTU and unemployment rate, Australia and the Netherlands 
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Source: For Australia ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands CPB (2001) and Muysken et al. 
(1994). 
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However, unemployment tripled in two years in the Netherlands, starting from an 
unprecedented height already in 1981, and that also provides a plausible explanation 
for the surge in long-term unemployment. The persistence then can be explained by 
the observation that it is very hard for an economy to absorb such a large number of 
long-term unemployed people. As is reported in Muysken (2001) the strong job 
growth in the Netherlands was mainly favourable to new entrants to the labour 
market. So while LNJ (1991) may claim search effectiveness declines and this 
contributes to rising unemployment rates, it is highly probable (as shown in Figure 2) 
that both are caused by insufficient demand for labour. The policy response then is 
entirely different. 
3.2 Phase diagrams of unemployment and vacancies 
Figures 5 and 6 represent phase diagrams for the unemployment rate and the vacancy 
rate, respectively (see Ormerod, 1994; Mitchell, 2001c). The current values of the 
respective time series are plotted on the y-axis against the lagged value of the same 
series on the x-axis. The years noted refer to the current year’s unemployment rate. 
For example, from Figure 5, Australia went from an unemployment rate of 1.4 per 
cent in 1960 to 3.1 per cent in 1961. We can look at these scatter plots in four distinct 
ways. First, the charts provide information on whether cycles are present in the data. 
Second, the presence of “attractor points” (Ormerod, 1994: 154) can be determined. 
The points might loosely be construed as the “centre of the ellipses traced out in such 
a plot” (Ormerod, 1994: 154). Third, the magnitude of the cycles can be inferred by 
the size of the cyclical ellipses around the attractor points. Fourth, the persistence 
(strength) of the attractor point can be determined by examining the extent to which it 
disciplines the cyclical observations following a shock. Weak attractors will not 
dominate a shock and the relationship will shift until a new attractor point exerts 
itself. 
Figure 5 reveals disparate unemployment behaviour between the two countries. 
Australia shifted its attractor in the 1974-76 period outwards, and the two subsequent 
recessions have oscillated around this higher point with varying cyclical magnitude. 
The explanation for Australia’s persistently high unemployment rate revolves around 
the factors that generated the shift. It is also clear that the economy takes several years 
to recover from a large negative shock even if the attractor remains constant. The 
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Netherlands also shifted its attractor outwards after the mid-1970s. In the early 1990s, 
the Dutch labour market oscillated rather tightly around this new attractor but in 
recent years has shown signs of moving towards a new, lower attractor. If the Dutch 
economy does establish a new low attractor then this would represent a clear 
difference from Australia, which appears to be stuck at the higher level. 
Figure 5 Unemployment rate relationships, Australia and The Netherlands 
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Source: ABS Job Vacancies, CPB Netherlands. 
Figure 6 shows vacancy rate relationships. The 1974-75 disturbances in the 
unemployment rate attractor in Australia also promoted a shift in the vacancy rate 
attractor, although in this case the movement was downwards. The supply-side 
analysis interprets the unemployment shift in Figure 5(a) as a decline in labour market 
efficiency. But the shift in Figure 6(a) using the same logic would be interpreted as 
increasing matching efficiency. Clearly, both states cannot hold. A consistent 
interpretation can be found in the view that the Australian economy has been demand 
constrained as a result of a regime shift in government policy in the mid-1970s. The 
rapid rise in unemployment in 1974 was so large that subsequent (lower) growth with 
on-going labour force and productivity growth could not reverse the stockpile of 
unemployed (Mitchell, 2001a). The endogenous supply effects that may have 
occurred in skill atrophy and work attitudes, if any, were not causal but reactive. 
A similar story can be told for the Netherlands after the mid-1970s. Figure 6(b) shows 
an adverse shift when compared to Figure 5(b), and the same holds for the movement 
in the late 1990s. 
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Figure 6 Vacancy rate relationships, Australia and The Netherlands 
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(b) The Netherlands 1966-2000 
Source: ABS Job Vacancies, CPB Netherlands. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the attractor analysis. First, the shifts in the 
attractors coincide with recessions. Second, the economy tends to oscillate around 
these attractors once they are established. This implies that adverse demand shocks 
have a strong negative impact on unemployment through hysteresis. The role of 
demand shocks is also highlighted by the opposite movements of the attractor points 
in vacancies after the demand shocks. 
Thus demand shocks have an adverse impact on unemployment both through the 
direct effects on job creation, as highlighted in the previous section, and indirectly 
through hysteresis, as highlighted in this section. 
3.3 Exploring the non-linearity further 
If we view the shifts in attractor points in the phase diagrams as endogenous events 
then they depict non-linear time series behaviour. For a linear AR(1) the cyclical 
ellipses would be clustered around the constant mean. Mitchell (2002) explores this 
theme further by testing a range of hypotheses concerning the non-linearity of the 
unemployment rate behaviour in Australia, Japan and the USA. In this paper, we use 
the Current Depth of Recession (CDR) approach, introduced by Beaudry and Koop 
(1993), to test one aspect of this non-linearity – the asymmetry in the response of the 
unemployment rate to negative and positive shocks, specifically, that negative shocks 
impact more strongly than positive shocks (see Mitchell, 2002 for further discussion). 
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Beaudry and Koop (1993) constructed the CDR variable as the difference between the 
previous maximum value for GNP minus the current value. We follow Parker and 
Rothman (1998) who construct the CDR for the unemployment rate as: 
{ } 0,...,5mint t s tsCDR U U− == −  
The differences between this approach and the Beaudry and Koop (1993) construction 
reflects the fact that the unemployment rate is a cyclical variable with no evidence of 
a strong trend. Accordingly, we define the minimum as the lowest value for the last 6 
quarters (a local minimum). CDR is then the difference between this value and the 
actual unemployment rate. When the unemployment is above this local minimum, the 
CDR variable is negative and measures the depth of recession. 
Figure 7 compares the unemployment rate and the CDR variable for each country. 
The comparison is interesting and shows that both labour markets went through 
similarly dated recessions. But the crucial 1975 recession impacted for longer in 
Australia than in the Netherlands. Figure 8 juxtaposes the CDR for Australia directly 
on the CDR for the Netherlands to further highlight the differences in the 1975 period. 
The depth of the 1975 recession was similar in both countries but the Dutch economy 
was better able to absorb the negative shock. The Australian economy briefly 
recovered from the oil shock-induced stagflation but then a sustained period of tight 
macroeconomic policy settings forced the economy back into a prolonged downturn. 
History tells us that the Australian labour market has never generated enough 
employment growth since 1975 to keep pace of the labour force and productivity 
growth and the stock-pile of unemployed that occurred in that period. 
A further notable difference shown in Figure 8 is that the Dutch economy experienced 
smaller recessions (using the CDR as the indicator) in the early 1980s and the early 
1990s. Once again, the Australian recovery in these latter recessions was retarded 
compared to the Netherlands. The downturn in the 1990s came much later for the 
Netherlands and was substantially more shallow. The Dutch labour market had less 
“stock” to move to reduce its unemployment rate compared to Australia. 
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Figure 7 Unemployment rates and CDR for Australia and the Netherlands 
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(a) The Netherlands 1971(2) to 2001(1) 
Source: ABS, The Labour Force, 6203.0 and OECD, Main Economic Indicators. 
Figure 8 CDR variable for Australia and the Netherlands 
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We then estimated the CDR effect in an autoregressive model (see Parker and 
Rothman, 1998). Full discussion of the results and the comparisons between the CDR 
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model and a linear AR model is presented in Mitchell (2002). In this paper, we 
present the results of the CDR regression and draw out the implications. 
Table 3 presents the preferred equations for Australia and the Netherlands. In both 
cases, the lag order was determined by reference to AIC and the CDR model provides 
a reduction in residual variance compared to the tested-down linear AR model. The 
results confirm the presence of the CDR effect in both countries. The significant 
negative CDR coefficient indicates that the unemployment rate increases quickly in 
recessions, but declines relatively slowly during expansions. The coefficient 
magnitude measures the strength of asymmetry, which is similar in both countries. 
The results confirm that a negative shock imposes higher costs on the labour market 
being more persistent than the opposite shock. The results also show that the impact 
of the shock depends on the current state of the labour market. A depressed labour 
market that is then confronted with restrictive macroeconomic policy will be driven 
deeper into a sustained period of high unemployment. 
Table 3 CDR regression results for Australia and the Netherlands. 
 Australia The Netherlands 
Sample 1960:4 to 2001:2 1971:2 to 2000:2 
Constant 0.058 0.060 
 (1.19) (0.94) 
UR(-1) 0.971 0.972 
 (124.3) (98.6) 
CDR -0.245 -0.256 
 (9.66) (9.68) 
R2 0.99 0.99 
s.e. 0.284 0.217 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
4. A digression: supply side explanations of unemployment 
The orthodox response may be that we are ignoring the role of labour costs in this 
analysis. In Mitchell and Muysken (2002), we analyse the so-called NAIRU-
approach, derived from the LNJ (1991) framework, since this has been the dominant 
force in debates on policy measures to combat unemployment. In that approach, the 
NAIRU is affected by institutional factors like benefit ratios, minimum wages, 
bargaining coordination by unions, employment protection and labour taxes. 
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Additionally, commodity prices and skill mismatch can play a role. However, as a 
result of the assumed production structure – a Cobb-Douglas production function is 
used – and the assumption of a constant benefit rate, neither labour augmenting 
technological change, nor changes in the capital stock or costs of capital can impact 
on the NAIRU in this model. That is a serious shortcoming and maintains the earlier 
conceptions of the natural rate hypothesis where the steady-state unemployment rate 
is not affected by fiscal or monetary policy. No scope is given for aggregate demand, 
technological change or capital costs to impact on unemployment.  
It is not surprising that the NAIRU-approach has been contested on precisely these 
grounds. Blanchard (1997) and Phelps (1994) argue for various reasons, that the 
NAIRU will increase with the real interest rate. This induced Phelps and Blanchard to 
argue that the high unemployment in Europe in the 1980s was caused by the high real 
interest rates. 
Ball (1999) develops a notion of hysteresis by assuming: “last fired, first rehired”.6 As 
a consequence the long-term unemployed do not put pressure on wages, although they 
can be reemployed if demand is sufficiently strong (see also Mitchell, 1987). This 
implies that the bargained real wage will increase if the share of long-term 
unemployment in total unemployment increases. And since this share tends to be 
positively related to total unemployment, the NAIRU will increase when 
unemployment increases. 
In terms of the evolution of the NAIRU literature examined, Modigliani (2000) takes 
the most extreme position on the validity of the NAIRU-approach. His analysis of the 
causes of European unemployment in the 1980s bears similarity with the explanations 
offered by Blanchard and Ball presented above. An important difference, however, 
emerges in Modigliani’s focus on the role of monetary policy in generating higher 
unemployment. Blanchard (1997) stresses the indirect route through increases in the 
relative price of labour with respect to capital, which leads to substitution of labour 
for capital accompany by an inward shift in the demand for labour as a result of the 
decrease in capital stock. Ball (1999) argues that monetary policy impacts adversely 
on aggregate demand, which, in turn, has a negative impact on the NAIRU through 
hysteresis. Modigliani (200) stresses the direct impact of aggregate demand, triggered 
by a decline in investment. He claims that excessively tight monetary policy has 
induced a fall in investment below the ‘full employment investment ratio’. Then, 
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through conventional Keynesian multiplier mechanisms, aggregate demand has 
declined and unemployment increased.7 Moreover, the shortfall in investment has 
persisted because monetary policy has remained too tight, combined with a tight fiscal 
policy motivated by the Maastricht-criteria. The aberrant monetary policy has been 
driven by an “obsessive fear of inflation” coupled with a “benign neglect policy for 
unemployment”(Modigliani, 2000: 3), which has induced the Bundesbank and later 
the ECB to systematically overestimate the NAIRU. 
Modigliani proposes a more expansionary monetary policy, “programmed in 
collaboration with the unions and the employers”(Modigliani, 2000: 14). Moreover, 
“rigidities in the labour market and poor work incentive designs” should be combated 
too, since these compound the effect of insufficient demand (Modigliani, 2000: 15). 
Figure 9 Unemployment and wage share, Australia and The Netherlands 
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(b) The Netherlands 1970-2000 
Source: Australia – ABS AUSSTATS database, The Netherlands – CPB (2001). Quarterly data was 
used for Australia and annual data for The Netherlands. 
Our approach in this paper is highly sympathetic to Modigliani’s analysis. To provide 
a rough impression of the impact of labour costs on employment, we show in Mitchell 
and Muysken (2002) that there is no unique relationship between employment and 
real unit labour costs in Australia and the Netherlands. For instance the relation in the 
1990s for both countries is virtually a horizontal line. From a similar perspective, 
Figure 9 presents the relationship between unemployment and the wage share for both 
countries. This figure clearly shows for both countries that the initial increase in the 
wage share was only associated with a relatively small rise in unemployment. 
Subsequently, the recessions of 1974 and 1982 in Australia were associated with 
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enormous increases in unemployment and hardly any change in the wage share. The 
same holds for the recession of 1981 in the Netherlands. When the wage share started 
to decrease in the mid-1980s in both countries unemployment was hardly affected. 
Finally, the wage share has hardly changed in both countries since the early 1990s but 
unemployment declined consistently in the Netherlands and fluctuated in Australia. 
All this illustrates that wage costs factors do not provide a consistently plausible 
explanation of the persistently high unemployment. We maintain our contention that 
demand factors largely explain the fluctuations in unemployment. 
5. Deficiencies in aggregate demand 
5.1 Not enough jobs have been created! 
To reinforce the demand-side explanation for the rise in unemployment in both 
countries it is useful to compute the evolution of the GDP gap, which indicates the 
deficiency of aggregate demand. For the unemployment rate to remain constant, real 
GDP growth has to be equal to the sum of labour force and labour productivity 
growth, other things equal. In the midst of on-going debates about labour market 
deregulation, minimum wages and taxation reform, the most salient, empirically 
robust fact that has pervaded the last two decades is that the actual GDP growth rate 
has rarely reached this required rate. Figure 9 is derived from annual analysis of GDP 
gap components (Mitchell, 2001a). 
The results are clear. Prior to 1974, the growth rate of GDP was sufficient to match 
the required growth rate set by the growth of the labour force and labour productivity 
in Australia. After that point, GDP growth was never sufficient and unemployment 
rises and falls reflected the history of that deficiency. The same holds for the 
Netherlands after 1981, although the gap closed in the late 1990s which was reflected 
in the sharp decline in unemployment. 
The GDP gap is influenced by three factors. First, investment, since fluctuations in 
investment typically drive the business cycle. In Mitchell and Muysken (2002) we 
show that the relationship between the investment shortfall and the unemployment 
rate is striking.8  
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Figure 9 GDP and Required GDP, Australia and the Netherlands, 1965-2000 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Th
ou
sa
nd
s 
(A
U
D
)
Required GDP
Actual GDP
 
(a) Australia 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
B
ill
io
n 
(D
FL
)
Required GDP
Actual GDP
 
(b) The Netherlands 
Source: Australia: ABS AUSSTATS Labour Force and National Accounts data. The Netherlands, CPB 
(2001). 
Figure 10 shows that the crucial rise in unemployment Australia in 1974 was preceded 
by a large jump in the investment shortfall, and the same holds for the rise in 
unemployment in the Netherlands in 1981. 
A second factor influencing the GDP gap is monetary policy through its impact on 
aggregate expenditures. Taking us through the Keynesian reasoning that investment 
affects aggregate demand, which in turn determines employment and unemployment, 
Modigliani (2000: 9) concludes, “We know from elementary economics that 
investments are affected by monetary policy (interest rates and credit availability). In 
fact as it is well known, this is the channel par excellence through which a Central 
Bank controls output and inflation. … Indeed, there is no economics fundamental that 
can lead anybody to hold the view that money can directly affect inflation up or down 
except through raising or curbing aggregate demand and thus the demand for labor, 
wages and prices.” In Mitchell and Muysken (2002) we provide extensive evidence 
that over the past 25 years in both Australia and the Netherlands that the respective 
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Central Banks have acted in accordance with Modigliani’s assessment above. For 
example, for Australia, sustained increases in short-term interest rates (driven by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia) occurred at times when a negative shock had already 
started to push the unemployment rate up (see Mitchell and Carlson, 2001; Mitchell 
and Muysken, 2002). 
Figure 10 Investment shortfall and unemployment rate, Australia and the Netherlands 
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(b) The Netherlands 1965-2000 
Source: Mitchell and Muysken (2002). 
Finally, the GDP gap is influenced by fiscal policy. One important aspect of the latter 
is public employment. Mitchell (2001b) argues that in the fifty years since the end of 
World War II, most OECD economies have gone from a situation where the 
respective governments ensured there were enough jobs to maintain full employment 
to a state where the same governments use unemployment to control inflation. A 
major aspect of this move has been the changes that have occurred in public sector 
employment. Many economies have undergone substantial restructuring of their 
public sectors with significant employment losses being endured. Table 4 shows that 
in Australia, the labour force has grown at an average compound rate of 1.87 per cent 
per annum since 1970. Over the same period, private employment has averaged 1.91 
per cent per annum, whereas public employment has averaged a rate of growth of 0.64 
per cent per annum (driven heavily by the growth in the 1970-75 period). Since 1990, 
the public sector has declined in absolute employment every year with a rapid –2.03 
per cent per annum average decline since 1995.  
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Table 4 Growth rates in labour market aggregates, Australia and the Netherlands, 
1970-1999 
  Public 
Employment 
Growth 
Private  
Employment 
Growth 
Total Employment 
Growth 
Labour Force 
Growth 
 Australia 0.64 1.91 1.67 1.87 
 The Netherlands 0.85 1.08 1.05 1.13 
Notes: Growth rates are annual average compound rates for the periods shown.  
Over the 30-year period from 1970, private employment growth in the Netherlands 
was 1.05 per cent per annum. Like Australia, it kept up with labour force growth of 
1.13 per cent. Dutch public sector growth lagged behind with a growth rate of 0.85 
per cent per annum After an upsurge in growth until the mid-1980s, employment 
growth in the Dutch public sector was virtually flat over the 1990s. As a consequence, 
the share of public employment rose in the Netherlands from 11.1 per cent of total 
employment to 14.7 per cent in 1985. Afterwards it fell back to just below its initial 
level, 10.7 per cent in 1999. So the pattern is similar to Australia except that the 
public sector deficiency is less damaging because the Dutch labour force growth is 
substantially below that of Australia. 
With private sector employment growing more or less commensurately with the 
labour force, the withdrawal of public sector employment has contributed 
significantly to the persistently high unemployment that Australia has experienced. As 
we have already indicated above, the Netherlands has partially eliminated this 
problem by shifting a large number of workers into the disabled category. That is, 
they do not show up in the official unemployment figures. If the governments 
expected the private sector to provide commensurately more jobs as public sector 
employment was cut, then they were wrong – in particular for Australia. The 
magnitude of private employment growth necessary to compensate for the public 
sector losses has been historically unattainable on any sustained basis. Mitchell 
(2001b) shows that a large reason why the U.S. has had a relatively low 
unemployment rate in the 1990s, is because public employment growth has kept pace 
with private employment growth and labour force growth. He shows that if the 
Australian public sector had have replicated the American behaviour over the 1970-
2000 period, then Australia would have an unemployment rate below 1.5 per cent.  
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5.2 The impact of policy and business deficiencies on aggregate demand 
In section 5.1 we showed the role the GDP gap had played in generating the sustained 
unemployment in Australia and the Netherlands. The importance of investment 
behaviour, monetary policy and fiscal policy was discussed. However, if the OECD 
Jobs Study (1994) model was convincing we should expect a host of supply side 
variables and others factors reflecting government regulations and transfer payments 
to be prominent in explaining the evolution of the GDP gap. To examine this further a 
simple dynamic regression modelling the GDP gap was run. The GDP gap was 
computed using the methodology outlined above and expressed in percentage form. 
We regressed the gap (as the dependent variable) on a range of variables, which 
capture various supply side, and/or demand side theories contained in the literature. 
We chose to represent the demand side by the measure of monetary policy (SPREAD) 
and the shortfall in investment spending (SHORTFALL) as depicted in Figure 9.9 In 
the Australian case, a range of supply side variables (including real wage costs 
measures and government benefits) was tried. None of the supply side variables were 
significant.10 
Table 5 GDP Gap Regressions, Australia and the Netherlands 
 Australia, 1960:4 to 2000:4 The Netherlands, 1975 to 1999 
 Regressor Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 Constant -0.00 (0.47) -13.91 (0.88) 
 SPREAD(-4) 0.001 (4.45) 6.54 (2.94) 
 SHORTFALL 0.002 (4.12) 524.82 (1.81) 
 YGAP (-1) 0.93 (53.1)   
 D753 -0.01 (2.59)   
 D824 0.02 (3.99)   
     
 R-squared 0.97  0.382080  
 S.E. of regression 0.005  13.34824  
 Mean dependent 
variable 0.033  8.379545  
Notes: D753 is unity in 1975:3 and zero otherwise. D824 is unity in 1982:4 and zero otherwise. t-
statistics in parentheses. Both spread and shortfall in the Netherlands are delayed one year. 
Table 5 reports the tested-down regression for Australia (1960:4 to 2000:4) and the 
Netherlands (1975 to 1999). There is some supportive evidence for The Netherlands, 
but given the limitations of annual data and the short sample available for the 
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SPREAD variable, we would not wish to put too much confidence in the results. For 
Australia, the diagnostics for the regression were sound. The regression forecasted 
satisfactorily out-of-sample over the 8 quarters. The results confirm that the shortfall 
in investment as a percentage of GDP was a key determinant of the GDP gap over the 
period examined. In addition, the era of tight monetary policy aimed at curbing 
inflation was also instrumental in maintaining the GDP gap. 
6. Conclusion 
We have demonstrated that employment and outcomes in both Australia and the 
Netherlands, are predominantly driven by aggregate demand. There is strong evidence 
to support this contention. The presence of hysteresis is also empirically founded and 
works to sustain negative shocks in the form of higher unemployment rates. 
The robustness of the results is strengthened by the fact that the two countries exhibit 
considerable diversity in economic structure. Despite all the labour market and related 
supply-side reforms that have been introduced in Australia over the last 15 years, the 
unemployment rate persists at high levels due to demand deficiency. In the same way 
demand deficiencies can explain to a large extent the fluctuations in the Dutch 
unemployment rate.  Moreover, the apparent Dutch success in combating 
unemployment is partly clouded by the huge increase in inactivity since the early 
1980s. This demand deficiency is due to declines in the investment ratio, a 
deflationary monetary policy and declines in public sector employment. We have 
illustrated for Australia and the Netherlands that these factors have played an 
important role in the determination of aggregate demand. Finally we have argued that 
the conventional NAIRU approach tends to neglect the role of aggregate demand and 
focuses on the supply side. The empirical foundation of the NAIRU is, however, now 
seriously questioned. 
The policy implications of the paper are clear. First, an inflation-first monetary policy 
tends to set interest rates too high due to an  excessive fear of inflation. Second, the 
evidence suggests that aggregate policy must work to keep the economy at high levels 
of activity to ensure that negative shocks are absorbed relatively quickly. In the 
context of Section 3, a sharp exogenous positive shock is required to shift the attractor 
down. In the context of this paper, this shock should come from the demand side. 
After more than 25 years of supply-side policies, the attracters do not seem to be 
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reacting to restore full employment. Third, the role of public sector employment is 
also crucial given that the private sector is unlikely to grow at rates sufficient to 
absorb the available labour supply. We argue that to return OECD economies back to 
full employment, the public sector must take a more active role in employment 
creation. Mitchell (1998) has proposed that a Job Guarantee be introduced by the 
public sector as a permanent solution to unemployment. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The lower number for the Netherlands when compared to Australia is due to both the lower rate of 
unemployment in the Netherlands and the possible underreporting of vacancies in Australia: the Dutch 
vacancy figures are not based on voluntary reporting by firms, but on survey data. 
2 However, the recovery of unemployment was much better relative to the Australian experience. To a 
certain extent this apparent recovery is biased due to the enormous amount of inactivity in the 
Netherlands, noted in the introduction. 
3 Note that due to limitations in the long-term unemployment data (starting March 1978) we have only 
been able to consider the last two recessions in Australia. 
4 Taking unemployment as the dependent variable, reflects our contention that unemployment is 
determined by demand for labour. When interpreted in terms of the employment function, where 
employment is determined by demand and supply of labour simultaneously (Muysken et al., 1994), this 
implies that we assume that demand for labour should follow supply of labour. Otherwise demand for 
labour is insufficient. 
5 For Australia we ignored long-term unemployment in the first period, since it was negligible anyhow. 
6 This is the way Nordhaus characterises Ball’s analysis in his comment. 
7 The multiplier mechanism is relevant in Europe because of the downward wage rigidity (Modigliani 
2000: 4). 
8 The shortfall refers to the extent to which the ratio of investment to full capacity income falls short of 
the full-employment investment ratio. See Mitchell and Muysken (2001) for further details. 
9  SPREAD refers to the spread between the short-term and long-term interest rates. 
10 The full data set for the Netherlands was not available on a quarterly basis and the annual data did 
not allow for a rich analysis of the evolution of the GDP gap for that country. The results for the 
Netherlands are at this stage experimental only. 
